MB Civic

Time is running out for political solution in Iraq
By Steve Negus

Published: June 6 2007 19:09 | Last updated: June 6 2007 19:09

When the latest deadline for a reconciliation package of laws designed to end Iraq’s violent insurgency came and went with little progress being shown, few people outside Baghdad’s heavily fortified “Green Zone” noticed or cared.

The end-May target, self-imposed by Iraqi politicians in an apparent bid to placate the Americans, was always somewhat arbitrary. Attempts to end the country’s agonising civil war through political rather than military means have never achieved much measurable success on the ground and expectations for a breakthrough this time were low from the start.

But now the public debate in Washington over a withdrawal date for American forces has made such a political solution even more important. US officials have said that they will weigh the Iraqis’ progress on the laws when they review their current military “surge” in September – which Iraqis understand to mean that, if they do not demonstrate progress, they may face a unilateral US troop withdrawal, or “drawdown”, leaving a security vacuum that even many anti-American parties in the country say would be a disaster.

“We have only two or three months, or maybe until the end of this year, to deliver,” says independent Kurdish parliamentarian Mahmoud Othman. “The Americans will make a review [of their current policies] in September, or maybe the end of the year. If the political parties and groups want to save this country they should have consensus, they should be flexible, otherwise they will all be in trouble.”

The Bush administration has frequently hinted that an Iraqi failure to produce a reconciliation package would speed a withdrawal. “Progress in reconciliation will be an important element in our evaluation in the late summer,” Robert Gates, the US secretary of defence, said in April, referring to the timeframe by which US commanders would judge whether the deployment of more troops into Iraq was succeeding. “Our commitment to Iraq is long-term, but it is not a commitment to have our young men and women patrolling Iraq’s streets open-endedly,” he said.

Iraq’s government is in a state of chaos but it remains the focus for US-led peacemaking efforts. Part of this flows from the recognition that the government itself – dominated by Shia with strong ties to militia groups – bears much responsibility for the current violence. Forcing it to change divisive policies is part of the broader effort to jump-start dialogue.

Some experts see a window of opportunity, pointing to faint signs that Iraq may be as close as it has been in the past few years to a political accord that would dramatically reduce tensions between warring Sunni and Shia factions. The Sunni seem to have overcome their aversion to participating in a new Shia-dominated political order and, despite a year of sectarian killing, have kept their seats in parliament and in the national unity government.

The insurgency itself is splitting, with nationalist groups at times engaging in pitched street battles with al-Qaeda-affiliated radicals. Former hardliners in the Shia parties now admit to the necessity of a political solution and are willing to talk about bringing former insurgents to the fold.

The national reconciliation package that is supposed to facilitate these efforts contains three major elements, each directed at a particular area of discord between Iraq’s ethnic and confessional groups. It comprises a law governing the country’s oil and gas industry; a review of the decentralised federal system outlined in the 2005 constitution, which was endorsed by Kurds but opposed by most Sunni and many Shia; and a revision of the laws purging leading members of the former ruling Ba’ath party from public life, which is favoured by most Sunni and the more conciliatory Kurds and Shia but strongly opposed by radical Shia.

Sunni also want the government to spell out a strong policy to eliminate Shia militias and have called for a delay in the process that would see the disputed province of Kirkuk vote this year on whether it should join the autonomous Kurdish region. Parliament is also expected to pass a law on provincial elections, which might help resolve some regional power struggles between Shia factions and bolster the authority of local Sunni leaders.

Of these, the oil law is perhaps closest to completion. After a year of arduous negotiation, the parties at the heart of the Iraqi government – the mainstream Shia Islamists and the Kurds – have hammered out most of an agreement that allows both the Shia-led federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan regional government a voice in the development of the oil industry. But there are several outstanding disagreements, such as a mechanism for sharing revenues and the control of oil fields in the north, and a final law is still just out of reach.

However, the factions have done very little to build up any support for a compromise among the public, leaving open the possibility that nationalists such as the Sadrists – followers of radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr – or some Sunni will oppose the law because it gives too much of a role to multinational companies and dilutes the power of the central government.

Oil also underlies much of the debate about the constitution. Sunni are concerned about clauses that would allow oil-rich southern Shia provinces to create an autonomous region similar to Iraqi Kurdistan – a development they fear could leave their oil-poor heartland in the centre of the country starved of resources.

An even thornier question concerns the future of the northern city of Kirkuk, claimed by both Kurds and Arabs. The Kurds fought to insert a clause in the constitution by which the mixed-ethnic province should vote this year in a referendum on whether it wants to join the Kurdish region. Such a referendum is expected to pass.

For many Kurds, the reclamation of a province that suffered brutal ethnic cleansing under Saddam Hussein, the former dictator, is the final stage of their decades-long struggle. Regional president Massoud Barzani has repeatedly warned of dire (if unspecified) consequences should the federal government not honour its agreements on a region he calls “the heart of Kurdistan”.

The mainstream Shia parties have grudgingly acquiesced to the Kurdish plan as the price of a long-term alliance, but the referendum is opposed by local Arab and Turcoman groups as well as by Sunni and by Shia radicals in Baghdad. Neither side has given any indication that it would budge.

The third main issue is de-Ba’athification. For two years, the US has been pushing the Shia government to rehabilitate members of the disproportionately Sunni former ruling Ba’ath party – reversing the purge promulgated by the Americans themselves. The Shia government has dragged its heels, however, and religious leaders have ruled out a reform that they say would allow “criminals” to infiltrate the government and even stage a coup.

None of these laws has been presented to parliament, which means that politicians have been staking out maximalist stances to appeal to their constituencies and do not seem interested in public discussion. The Americans, meanwhile, have expressed impatience with the apparent unwillingness of prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government to take political risks by sponsoring unpopular laws.

“Clearly there are going to be challenges in the council of representatives [parliament], but you have to get [the reconciliation laws] to the council of representatives before it can face the challenges,” Ryan Crocker, Washington’s ambassador to Baghdad, said in an interview with the FT last month. “In a democracy you get what you fight for – if you don’t fight for it you don’t get it.”

With the government faltering, a number of political blocs including the Sadrists, the Sunni and supporters of Iyad Allawi, the secular-leaning former prime minister, are exploring alternative coalitions, hoping for the backing of an increasingly desperate US.

However, most of these groups actually have less in common with each other than they do with the government – most Sadrists, for example, hate Mr Allawi for his campaign against their 2004 insurgency. The current Kurdish-Shia alliance, whatever its weaknesses, may be the only genuinely viable ruling coalition that exists.

Others appear to be waiting for an American withdrawal. The Sadrists, for example, have circulated a petition calling for a timeline for US troops to pull out. But they appear to be among the few who are genuinely enthusiastic about the prospect – perhaps because they have the largest grassroots movement and one of the strongest militias, making them better placed than others to take advantage of the ensuing power-vacuum.

Finally – and more ominously – it may be that the Shia and Kurdish parties which dominate the government can patch up their differences, produce drafts for parliament and pressure their legislators to vote them through over the opposition. But this would leave Sunni interests unrepresented and bring little by way of reconciliation.

If the parties ignore their own constituencies, meanwhile, they may weaken the government even further. Mr Maliki’s government is already hard-pressed to control the security forces, even though both the prime minister and the majority of his troops are Shia. It could end up with a reconciliation package but not enough legitimacy or authority to make the factions stop fighting each other.

Unfortunately, Iraq is probably far away from the kind of consensus that would allow a truly legitimate, non-sectarian government to preside over a united country – if indeed that consensus is out there at all. The government might be able to hold the line with American support, but US domestic backing for the commitment in Iraq is swiftly evaporating.

The time needed to complete a genuine reconciliation agreement is probably measured in years. Iraq’s leaders can only be confident that they have months left.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007