MB Civic

By Steven N. Simon | August 20, 2006 | The Washington Post

AFTER FOILING an apparent terrorist plot against US-bound airliners, Washington and London can take satisfaction in a remarkably successful operation that probably saved thousands of lives. Just as important, the arrests in the United Kingdom and Pakistan may yield important information about how Al Qaeda forges links with global networks. Given their strength and durability, these links won’t go away.

So far, policymakers and the media have focused on the British end of the chain, where conditions that have fueled an epidemic of treason and an inexhaustible supply of terrorist infantry are unlikely to wane. But we ought to pay closer attention to the Pakistani side, where a radicalized society virtually guarantees the survival of Al Qaeda — or whatever one wishes to call this beating heart of a global jihad.

Pakistan was crippled at birth. It emerged from a monumental massacre and was based on a religious ideology that hindered the development of political and social institutions that might have transformed the state into a nation. This congenital curse kept Pakistan from accepting the decision of the maharaja in Kashmir to remain in India — establishing a legacy of grievance that has since become the touchstone of radical politics. The frailty of Pakistani politics, the steady erosion of space available to secular parties, and the regime’s consequent need for legitimacy have left politics open to highly mobilized religious parties whose reading of Islam is intensely confrontational.

These parties are vertically integrated. They operate madrassas, or religious schools , that indoctrinate students who are then deployed into party militias. They are heavily armed and well funded, in part by state subsidies intended to win their loyalty . The leadership of some of these radical parties includes recently retired officers of the state security agency, the Interservices Intelligence Directorate, that is supposed to keep a lid on subversive activity. (It was charged with the care of the Taliban in the years before Sept. 11.) Many of its officers believe that, by compelling Pakistan to sever these relationships, Washington forced Islamabad to forfeit its vital interests.

No one is really sure about the loyalty of junior officers in the army, and there is no reason to believe they are any more immune to the lure of religious radicalism than civilians their age. The reliability of the corps commanders, especially those responsible for Rawalpindi and Islamabad, is unquestioned — at least among Washington analysts — but nobody knows how the troops will react when the secular government is at stake. And a spate of assassination attempts on President Pervez Musharraf suggests this isn’t just a hypothetical question.

Unfortunately, this society is one of the most anti-American places on the planet. It is no accident that the leadership of Al Qaeda maintains such a secure life in Pakistan’s northwest . Pakistani society is also highly mobilized, not least because of umbilical links between that country and its former colonial ruler, Great Britain. British authorities now believe that at least two of the bombers who attacked London’s buses and subways last year visited Pakistan in preparation for the attack.

It was once thought that first-generation immigrants were the ones who maintained close ties to their country of origin. This was the cohort that read native-language newspapers, belonged to social groups filled with other immigrants , sent away for wives from home, and dreamed of ultimate repatriation, if only for burial. All the while, these newcomers would work hard and demonstrate loyalty to their adopted country, lest they invite trouble. Their children and grandchildren would inevitably assimilate, seduced by appetites and ambitions that a consumerist society stirs in its youth. But it turns out that, like 1960s-era predictions of the death of religion , this picture doesn’t conform to reality. Animated by a mix of nationalism and religious fervor , some second- and third-generation young men instead perpetuate — and even intensify — family connections to the old country .

Moreover, the burgeoning immigration from South Asia and the Middle East to Europe creates a continual flow of new arrivals, with each wave bringing fresh grievances. A recent global Pew opinion poll found that 81 percent of British Muslims thought of themselves as Muslim first and British second. In France, the comparable figure was 46 percent. Only one country surveyed had a higher percentage of respondents identifying themselves as Muslims first, and a citizen of their country second: Pakistan (87 percent).

Great Britain has consciously pursued a multiethnic identity in recent years, but assimilation is failing. A British government study leaked to The Times of London in 2004 estimated that there were 10,000 Al Qaeda sympathizers in the United Kingdom. According to a BBC report in early July, British security services believe that 1,200 people in Britain are engaged in terrorist activity there and overseas. The transformation of Pakistani politics and society, coupled with the apparently burgeoning supply of recruits in Britain, indicates that there is more trouble in store.

There is no magic cure for what ails Pakistan and endangers Americans. There are, however, steps that might help over the long haul. It is essential that Washington press Islamabad to open the political arena to secular parties. The regime’s refusal to share power with these players has forced it to deal with the devil, providing the radical religious parties with the opportunity and resources to mortgage the country’s future to extremism. The United States can also intensify its efforts to rebuild public education in Pakistan to reduce the demand for madrassas that feed the maw of the religious militias.

There are faint glimmers of hope. Pakistan did make arrests after British authorities identified specific individuals as suspects. But British and Pakistani authorities still do not agree on why two of the 2005 subway bombers visited Pakistan in 2004 or what they did while there. In the bigger scheme of things, Musharraf knows he has a problem and would like to do something about it; he just doesn’t know what.

Authorities in the United Kingdom also know they have a problem, but at least they have a sensible plan: a mix of community policing and public policies designed to foster a more-inclusive British society. Their problem is that the violence contemplated by Islamic militants may spur intercommunal tensions that turn community policing into aggressive policing and an inclusive society into an exclusive one. If that happens, Americans can expect to feel the heat.

Steven N. Simon is the Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and coauthor of “The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terrorism and a Strategy for Getting it Right.”