MB Civic

By Derek Chollet and Jon B. Wolfsthal | May 8, 2006 | The Boston GlobeAS THE CLOCK ticks on Iran’s nuclear program — and Washington’s pundits and policymakers rumble about a possible military showdown — the Bush administration has all but turned its back on a nuclear threat that is just as dangerous to America’s security interests: North Korea. The failure to deal with North Korea’s growing nuclear program is unwise on its own — but worse, it makes any US effort to end Iran’s nuclear ambitions harder.

For the past five years, Iran and North Korea have been the most urgent proliferation threats facing the United States. Yet so far the administration has been unable to come up with a viable policy for either. It gets the rhetoric right: In 2003, President Bush said that he ”would not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea,” a sentiment he has echoed many times toward Iran. Unfortunately the words have not been backed up with resolve or meaningful action.

For nearly three years the administration approached the North Korea issue by wavering between half-hearted diplomacy and uncoordinated pressure tactics, refusing to talk to North Koreans face-to-face and choosing instead to argue over the shape of the table. The resulting six party talks with China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia were token efforts, meant more to pressure North Korea than to achieve real results. Even President Bush’s former top envoy to these talks called them ”drive-by negotiations.”

It was not until last fall that American diplomats began to act decisively. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice empowered Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill to deal directly with the North Koreans. This new engagement worked, as Hill extracted important pledges from Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear programs in exchange for discussions about possible cooperation on alternative energy sources.

But even then the administration began to falter. As soon as the North Koreans inevitably and expectedly tried to negotiate for more, the administration reverted back to its previous approach and allowed important but secondary issues like North Korea’s counterfeiting American currency to block progress. The September deal unraveled, and now seven months later the United States is back at square one — no other six-party talks are even scheduled. Meanwhile Pyongyang has quadrupled its nuclear arsenal potential and continues to operate a plutonium production reactor and could extract the material as early as this month, providing it with enough material to take its suspected nuclear arsenal from nine to 12 nuclear weapons.

Instead of walking away from the problem, the United States must work to test North Koreans’ willingness to deal by engaging them directly. Rather than allowing less urgent issues to stand in the way, it should offer to meet with North Korea anytime and anywhere to make rapid progress on the nuclear issue. And in the event that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions cannot be reversed, the United States needs to act now to shore up its deterrence on the peninsula, including by bringing back the troops moved from Korea to Iraq and strengthening tactical missile defenses and air and naval forces.

Finding a way to jump-start dealing with the North Korea threat is critical for the stability of East Asia; but it will also show a possible way out of our current impasse with Iran. North Korea’s success in acquiring a nuclear capacity has provided Iran with a reliable playbook — one they continue to use with great success.

Ignoring the problem of North Korea in the hopes it will solve itself has left Iran emboldened. Watching closely as an isolated, oil-poor country like North Korea works to acquire the bomb right under the noses of the West, leaders in Tehran have correctly calculated that now is their time to build a nuclear option. Their goals are clear: Create the facts on the ground, tie the international community up in process, and keep the United States on the sidelines.

As Tehran nears the nuclear threshold, familiar postures from Washington suggest they may be as at least as successful as North Korea. That’s why the United States needs to alter direction now and act decisively to solve both problems — being willing to engage both countries directly.

Few believe that the chances for success are good. But if the administration does not alter its course, it seems certain that President Bush’s successor will inherit the worst of all possible worlds: two new nuclear states hostile to American interests, and a nonproliferation regime in tatters. The president has said the United States must do ”all it can” to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Surely, this at least includes a serious attempt at negotiations through direct dialogue.

Derek Chollet and Jon B. Wolfsthal are fellows in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.