[Mb-civic] Why Are They Speaking Up Now? - Melvin Laird, Robert Pursley - Washington Post Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

Why Are They Speaking Up Now?
<>By Melvin R. Laird and Robert E. Pursley
The Washington Post
Wednesday, April 19, 2006; A17

The retired general officers who have recently called for the 
resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld want to convince the 
public that civilian control has silenced military wisdom regarding the 
war in Iraq. They have chafed at Rumsfeld's authoritarian style and they 
may even have legitimate differences of opinion with his decisions. But, 
while their advice and the weight of their experience should be taken 
into account, the important time for them to weigh in was while they 
were on active duty.

The two of us have experienced many of the circumstances confronting 
Rumsfeld. Our experience and connections at the Defense Department tell 
us that these generals probably had numerous opportunities to advise and 
object while on active duty. For them to now imply otherwise is 
disingenuous and quite possibly harmful for our prospects in Iraq. And 
it misrepresents the healthy give-and-take that we are confident is 
widespread between the civilian leadership at the Pentagon and the 
capable military hierarchy. A general officer is expected to follow 
orders, but he is also entitled to advise if he thinks those orders are 
flawed.

The ghost of Vietnam may be whispering to these retired generals, who 
understandably want to guarantee that military wisdom is never again 
trampled by political expediency. They make their point by implying that 
Rumsfeld has run amok and does not listen to his admirals and generals. 
Yet recently retired Joint Chiefs chairman Gen. Richard Myers and his 
successor, Gen. Peter Pace (from the Air Force and Marine Corps, 
respectively), have rebutted the argument that the military was 
sidelined. Myers and Pace are in a position to know.

Rumsfeld respects the delicate balance between military expertise and 
civilian control, but in the end the decisions are his to make. Our 
democracy is designed to favor civilian control of defense decisions. 
The problem is that when military advice is considered and then 
rejected, officers are likely to feel sidelined. Sometimes we all must 
wait for hindsight to be able to make accurate judgments.

An example: In the early and mid-1970s as we were considering and 
eventually implementing the all-volunteer force to replace the draft, 
there were numerous people, uniformed and civilian, active duty and 
retired, predicting all manner of dire consequences. The criticisms were 
harsh. Yet the all-volunteer force has turned out to be an exceptionally 
valuable and effective innovation.

This is not to say that in hindsight Rumsfeld will be seen as 
infallible. No secretary of defense has made every decision correctly, 
and because lives are at stake, those decisions are critical. The 
appropriate opportunity for military officers to offer constructive 
criticism and to shape policy that helps avoid disastrous consequences 
is when those officers are still on active duty. But ultimately, and 
rightly, our system leaves the final decisions to the elected civilians 
and their appointees.

There are many avenues through which military ideas can be expressed. 
The uniformed service chiefs and civilian service secretaries meet 
frequently with the secretary of defense. We still have many friends and 
associates in the military and the Defense Department. We are confident 
that Rumsfeld does not limit those who meet with him to proffer advice. 
Access by the military through the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure and 
especially through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is frequent and 
influential. The commanders in chief of the various commands have ready 
access to the secretary of defense. A little known or appreciated fact 
is that historically the uniformed military has been afforded more 
participation in the National Security Council than any other entity -- 
including the defense secretary. The secretary's office is populated 
with numerous uniformed personnel, presenting still another source of 
access for military input. Beyond the executive branch is the extensive 
exposure and opportunity to express military views before Congress.

For such widespread access to be effective there must be shared 
responsibility for aggressively moving information up the chain of 
command. Not all military advice makes it through the military channels. 
Senior officers tend to be sensitive when their subordinates germinate 
ideas. And there are those in each military department who tend to put 
their branch loyalties above that of the broader national security 
objectives. The result is that some advice comes with selfish motives 
attached and some never arrives at all.

The retired officers who have criticized Rumsfeld have served their 
country with distinction. The military -- active duty and retired -- has 
a wealth of intelligent, articulate and motivated people. Their sense of 
duty, integrity and patriotism are of the highest order. But each of 
them speaks from his own copse of trees and may not have a view of the 
larger forest. In criticizing those with the broader view, they should 
be mindful of the risks and responsibilities inherent in their acts. The 
average U.S. citizen has high respect for the U.S. military. That 
respect is a valuable national security asset. Criticism, when carried 
too far, risks eroding it.

We do not advocate a silencing of debate on the war in Iraq. But care 
must be taken by those experienced officers who had their chance to 
speak up while on active duty. In speaking out now, they may think they 
are doing a service by adding to the reasoned debate. But the enemy does 
not understand or appreciate reasoned public debate. It is perceived as 
a sign of weakness and lack of resolve.

Melvin R. Laird was a Republican representative from Wisconsin before 
serving as secretary of defense from 1969 to 1973. Robert E. Pursley, a 
retired lieutenant general in the Air Force, was military assistant to 
three secretaries of defense.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/18/AR2006041801172.html?nav=hcmodule
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