MB Civic

By Ahmed Hashim  |  June 9, 2006 |  The Boston Globe

THE KILLING of Al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is clearly an important event. What is less clear is whether it’s the turning point in the Iraqi insurgency, as portrayed in the relentless self-congratulation evident on the electronic media yesterday, particularly on those channels whose analyses of the situation on the ground over the past three years have proven to be wafer-thin, long on blind faith and short on empirical fact.

At a minimum, though, the development opens the door for most parties in the Iraqi conflict to reassess their relationships and to ponder promising new strategies to achieve their goals and reduce the ongoing bloodshed.

Has Zarqawi’s killing sounded the death-knell of the insurgency? That’s possible in the long run, though developments early on may suggest otherwise. At first, we may see an upsurge by Al Qaeda in Iraq to prove that it is still “in the running.” Indeed, its deputy commander indicated the fight will go on. Al Qaeda’s brand of religious extremism has garnered significant support among the most dispossessed and adrift elements of the Sunni Arab population, as well as among some former security officials who suddenly found religion after their previous regime’s ignominious collapse.

Moreover, Zarqawi’s death will have an impact on morale: It may demoralize the insurgents and improve the morale of the government and the allied coalition. This psychological factor cannot be underestimated. It is particularly significant for the Shi’ite population, the paramount community in the country. Many Shi’ite leaders, clerics, and politicians have implored their community not to succumb to the siren song of ethnic conflict, a situation that Zarqawi and his ilk — who loathe the Shia on religious and political grounds — sought to bring about with their relentless and vicious assaults on innocent civilians. The Shia are known for their long-suffering patience, and Zarqawi’s death is likely to reinforce their belief that they eventually will triumph over their oppressors without descending — too much — to their level.

On the other hand, the above interpretation assumes that the insurgency has been led, or more accurately “hijacked,” by Al Qaeda. I have never believed this. Indeed, given the supreme importance of human intelligence in counterinsurgency and our general lack of success at it, it would not be surprising if Zarqawi’s exact — rather than general — whereabouts were revealed to the coalition and Iraqi forces by local groups that had simply had enough of his ideology and murderous operational methods. There has been a major behind-the-scenes struggle over the soul of the insurgency, its vision, and its relationship to the enemy.

Over the past several months, Sunni Arab tribes in Al Anbar came to the conclusion that Zarqawi and his group were doing serious harm to their aspirations, demands, and visions of the future. At a major meeting of Sunni Arab tribal elders and politicians in early March, there was unanimous condemnation of Al Qaeda’s indiscriminate targeting and strategy of killing innocents. The killing of tribal sheikhs and members by Al Qaeda was the last straw.

These groups are not necessarily pro-coalition; indeed, they talk about righteous resistance to the foreign occupation and its alleged depredations. The resilience of the insurgency lies in the support it has in the Sunni community and in those self-professed “mainstream” Islamist, nationalist and tribal-based opponents of the coalition presence. This constellation of insurgents has concrete grievances that relate specifically to unhappiness with the Sunni community’s political and socioeconomic position in post-Saddam Iraq. They are not interested in furthering the Islamist war against “infidels.” This apocalyptic battle is of little relevance to their circumstances.

Significantly, many of these groups refer to the insurgency as “Al Muqawamah,” or the resistance, and not as a holy war or jihad. Indeed, Zarqawi’s death may be of the utmost significance to the insurgency at first, and then ultimately for the coalition. First, his death may “liberate” the insurgency from the extremists and allow it to focus on its concrete demands and legitimate grievances without fear of being outflanked or upstaged by the extremists. This may benefit the coalition because we might be more willing to deal with more rational elements.

Second, if the death of Zarqawi manages to marginalize the extremists, the mainstream insurgents might be freer to develop a coherent political and military wing in tandem, something they have been endeavoring to do for months.

Third, the death might lead to the insurgency’s breaking free of the taint of terrorism, since many of the groups have a more circumscribed set of targets than the one associated with Zarqawi and his acolytes. This again might help in propelling them slowly but surely into the political process and away from violence.

But this depends to some extent on our ability to articulate an effective political strategy to take advantage of the dynamic flux within the insurgency. It also depends on the ability of the mainstream insurgent groups to act coherently to marginalize Al Qaeda, to rein in extremists within their own ranks, and to articulate a set of legitimate demands to the coalition and the Iraqi government through Sunni politicians and parties at the center.

Ahmed Hashim is associate professor of strategic studies at the US Naval War College, and has served in Iraq. This article does not necessarily represent the views of the US government or of the college