[Mb-civic] A New Strategy on Iran - Dennis Ross - Washington Post Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

A New Strategy on Iran
<>
By Dennis Ross
The Washington Post
Monday, May 1, 2006; A19

The United States and Iran are playing programmed roles in a minuet on 
nuclear weapons. The United States pushes the U.N. Security Council to 
warn Iran about the consequences of going nuclear. And Iran continues 
its march toward development of nuclear power, even as its president 
declares that "we don't give a damn" about U.N. resolutions calling on 
Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment.

With the Russians and Chinese seemingly determined to block sanctions, 
our efforts at the United Nations promise to evolve slowly while Iran 
presses ahead with its plans. If we stay on the same path, we will be 
left with two choices: accept the reality of Iran's nuclear weapons 
capability or take military action to set back its ambitions.

Either outcome could prove disastrous. If Iran succeeds, in all 
likelihood we will face a nuclear Middle East. The Saudis -- fearing an 
emboldened Iran determined to coerce others and to promote Shiite 
subversion in the Arabian Peninsula -- will seek their own nuclear 
capability, and probably already have a deal with Pakistan to provide it 
should Iran pose this kind of threat. And don't expect Egypt to be 
content with Saudi Arabia's being the only Arab country with a nuclear 
"deterrent."

As for those who think that the nuclear deterrent rules that governed 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War will also apply in a nuclear Middle East: Don't be so confident. For 
one thing, the possible number of nuclear countries will drive up the 
potential for miscalculation. For another, with an Iranian president who 
sees himself as an instrument for accelerating the coming of the 12th 
Imam -- which is preceded in the mythology by the equivalent of 
Armageddon -- one should not take comfort in thinking that Iran will act 
responsibly.

But the alternative of using force to prevent or forestall the Iranians' 
going nuclear does not look much better. To begin with, there are no 
simple or clean military options. Air operations alone might involve 
striking hundreds of targets, many in populated areas where there are 
significant air defense capabilities in the process of being upgraded by 
the Russians. The more casualties we inflict, the more we inflame the 
Islamic world.

Perhaps we could manage the response if the military campaign inflicted 
relatively few casualties and succeeded in setting back the Iranian 
nuclear program. But such a rosy scenario assumes that Iran's ability to 
retaliate is relatively limited. Even if we have the means to prevent 
the Iranian navy and air force from shutting down shipping into and out 
of the Persian Gulf, Iran has other options for turning any effort to 
take out its nuclear capability into a wider war.

The Iranians can foment far greater numbers of insurgent attacks against 
our forces in Iraq -- literally trying to set the earth on fire under 
our feet. To cut off the support for such attacks we could be driven to 
act militarily across the border into Iran on the ground. Perhaps Iran 
would realize that an escalating conflict with the United States is too 
dangerous, but after underestimating the risks we encountered in Iraq, 
can we be so confident about what the Iranians might do?

If neither outcome that our current policy is likely to produce is 
acceptable, should we not look for another pathway? Of course, but the 
challenge remains one of changing the Iranian calculus. Iran must see 
that it either loses more than it gains by proceeding to move toward 
nuclear weapons or that it can gain more by giving up the effort. The 
problem with the current policy is that it threatens costs that either 
aren't believable or are likely to pale in comparison with what the 
Iranians see themselves gaining with nuclear power.

But what if we could threaten collective sanctions that the Iranians 
would see as biting? What if those were combined with possible gains in 
terms of a deal on nuclear energy, economic benefits and security 
understandings if the Iranians would give up the nuclear program?

While one can argue that the Europeans were trying to negotiate 
something like this with the Iranians, they were never able to put 
together a package of credible sanctions and inducements, because the 
United States was not really a part of the effort. True, this country 
has coordinated with the British, French and Germans in the Bush second 
term. But a serious effort at raising the costs to the Iranians and 
offering possible gains has never been put together.

Why not now? Why not have the president go to his British, French and 
German counterparts and say: We will join you at the table with the 
Iranians, but first let us agree on an extensive set of meaningful -- 
not marginal -- economic and political sanctions that we will impose if 
the negotiations fail. Any such agreement would also need to entail an 
understanding of what would constitute failure in the talks and the 
trigger for the sanctions.

The Europeans have always wanted the Americans at the table. Agreeing on 
the sanctions in advance would be the price for getting us there. To be 
sure, the United States would focus as well on what could be provided to 
the Iranians, but the benefits have always been easier to agree on, 
particularly since meaningful sanctions will also impose a price on us. 
Real economic sanctions would not just bite Iran and its ability to 
generate revenue but also would undoubtedly drive up the price of oil. 
Our readiness to accept that risk at a time when high gasoline prices 
are becoming a domestic political issue would convey a very different 
signal about our seriousness to the Iranians -- who presently don't fear 
sanctions because they think they have the world over a barrel.

There is no guarantee such an approach will work with Iran. This Iranian 
government may simply be determined to have nuclear weapons. If that is 
the case, and if President Bush is determined to prevent Iran from 
gaining nuclear weapons -- as he has said -- we would still be better 
off having tried a direct negotiating option before resorting to what 
inevitably will be a difficult, messy use of force once again.

The writer was director for policy planning in the State Department 
under President George H.W. Bush and special Middle East coordinator 
under President Bill Clinton. He is counselor of the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043000869.html?nav=hcmodule
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