[Mb-civic] The enemy we hardly know - Robert Malley, Peter Harling - Boston Globe Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

  The enemy we hardly know

By Robert Malley and Peter Harling  |  March 19, 2006  |  The Boston Globe

ON THE third anniversary of the US invasion in Iraq, the United States 
is still fighting an enemy it barely knows. Washington relies on crude, 
broad-brush identifications -- Saddamists, Islamofascists, and the like. 
Rather than analyze the armed opposition's strategy and objectives, it 
assumes them. Rather than listen to what the insurgents say, it 
dismisses it. All of which is mystifying and, of far greater importance, 
self-defeating.

For months, the International Crisis Group has probed the armed groups' 
communications since the insurgency's inception. The electronic and 
paper trails are bountiful. The lessons are both highly instructive and 
deeply disturbing. For the United States to ignore the insurgents' 
discourse -- at a time when they evidently are paying close attention to 
what Washington has to say -- is to wage the struggle with one hand tied 
behind your back.

Figuring out who the insurgents are, what they are trying to achieve, 
how they have evolved, and what their vulnerabilities are is not a 
guessing game. They haven't concealed it. They've broadcast it on 
websites, Internet chat rooms, magazines, leaflets, videos, and 
audiotapes. Given conditions under which insurgents must operate, it's 
safe to assume that these represent a significant part, maybe even the 
bulk, of their communications, whether directed at one another or at 
Iraqi and Muslim populations.

To pore over them is to be offered a real-life glimpse into the themes 
insurgents consider most apt to mobilize activists and legitimize their 
actions, to witness their internal debates and level of coordination, 
and to assess their tactical or strategic shifts.

Several conclusions emerge:

The insurgency began as scattered, erratic, and chaotic, not organized 
by Saddam Hussein and his henchmen, but by a cacophonous set of groups 
divided between jihadists and nationalists that sought to outdo one 
another with the gruesomeness and savagery of their operations. No more. 
Today, it increasingly is dominated by a handful of large groups that 
enjoy sophisticated means of communication. They are well organized, 
produce regular publications, react to political developments, and, to a 
surprising degree, coordinate their words and deeds. Over the past year, 
they have tried to shed any outward appearance of disunity, converging 
around a set of relatively homogenous practices and discourse that blend 
Islamist Salafism and Iraqi patriotism and dilute what once were 
considered rigid distinctions between foreign jihadis and Iraqi combatants.

Their methods continue to be brutal, but a notable evolution has been 
demonstrated. As shown by their internal communications, and as they 
have become more coordinated and streamlined, insurgent groups have 
shown greater awareness of public opinion. They systematically and 
promptly respond to accusations of moral depravity or blind violence. 
All -- Al Qaeda in Iraq included -- strenuously, if disingenuously, 
reject accusations of waging a sectarian campaign. They publicize, in 
words and images, their purported efforts to protect or aid civilians. 
They have discarded some of the more gruesome and locally controversial 
practices, such as beheading hostages or attacking people going to the 
polls. And they systematically accuse the United States and its Iraqi 
allies of conducting a dirty war in coordination with sectarian 
militias, engaging in torture, fostering the country's division, and 
showing insensitivity to civilian life.

The insurgents have proved surprisingly adept at adjusting their tactics 
to fit their enemy's. Their Internet postings, chat discussions, and 
publications exhibit implicit self-criticism and overt tactical 
fine-tuning. Having initially opposed elections -- going so far as to 
physically harm those who dared associate with them -- they changed 
course, sensing that their approach had backfired. On the ground, they 
have answered the US strategy of ''clear, hold, and build" with one of 
their own: recoil, redeploy, and spoil. Rather than confront the enemy 
head on, as they had sought to do, they are taking advantage of military 
flexibility, the limited number of US troops, and the fragility of Iraqi 
security forces to attack at the time and place of their choosing.

But the insurgents' communications tell another, more worrisome story: 
After three years of fighting, they are more optimistic and convinced of 
their victory. Confidence is often propaganda, and it would be 
surprising if the insurgents didn't display it. But whereas yesterday's 
self-assurance was expressed in terms of an open-ended jihad against an 
occupier, today's belies a conviction that victory is at hand, America's 
withdrawal is within reach, and the collapse of Iraq's postwar 
institutions are within sight.

Of course, the insurgency is neither infallible nor unassailable; its 
discourse demonstrates its vulnerability. Televised confessions in Iraq 
of captured insurgents and accusations of sectarianism, brutality, and 
depravity, as well as the various elections held in 2005, all had a 
visible impact on the armed opposition, shaking its confidence and 
bringing about tangible changes in its behavior and rhetoric.

But the central message is this: The coalition's most effective tools 
have not been of a military but rather of a political nature. The 
insurgency depends heavily on its legitimacy, which essentially relies 
on opposition to the occupation, anger at its specific practices, and 
the feeling shared by Sunni Arabs of being under siege.

That the insurgency has survived, even thrived, despite being vastly 
outnumbered and outgunned, suggests flaws and limitations of the current 
counterinsurgency campaign. The insurgents' discourse may be dismissed 
as rhetoric, but they appear to have effectively reached agreement on 
core operational matters, grown in self-assurance, and exhibited greater 
sensitivity to Sunni Arab opinion.

The trend remains fragile -- the surface homogeneity probably conceals 
deep-seated tensions; the confidence may be short-lived; and the 
sensitivity has its obvious, and visible, limitations. But the United 
States needs to take these into account if it is to understand the 
insurgency's resilience and learn how to counter it.

An effective counterinsurgency campaign will require grasping the 
insurgents' political dimension, taking their discourse seriously, and 
directing efforts at the sources of their popular support. That means 
mainly controlling the behavior of Iraqi security forces, curbing the 
use of torture, halting resort to collective punishment and other 
methods that inflict widespread civilian harm, and ending reliance on 
sectarian militias.

It means, too, making clear that the United States will withdraw as soon 
as the newly elected government requests, and agreeing in the interim to 
negotiate, openly, the terms of its presence and its rules of 
engagement. US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has recently struck a candid 
and useful tone but more proactive measures are needed.

The United States and its allies cannot be expected to establish a 
monopoly over the use of force. But they can and should be expected to 
establish a monopoly over the legitimate use of force -- which means 
establishing beyond doubt the legitimacy both of the means being 
deployed and of the state on whose behalf force is being exercised. 
That, at a minimum, is required to get a handle on an insurgency that is 
telling us what the administration is refusing to hear.

Robert Malley, a former adviser to President Clinton, is Middle East 
program director at the International Crisis Group. Peter Harling is a 
senior analyst with Crisis Group.

http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/03/19/the_enemy_we_hardly_know/
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