[Mb-civic] IMPORTANT: U.S. Policy Seen as Big Loser in Palestinian Vote - Washington Post

[William Swiggard]

U.S. Policy Seen as Big Loser in Palestinian Vote

By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, January 28, 2006; A16

Standing in a sunny Rose Garden on June 24, 2002, surrounded by his top 
foreign policy advisers, President Bush issued a clarion call for 
resolving the deadly Israeli-Palestinian conflict: "I call on the 
Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror."

This week, Palestinians gave their answer, handing a landslide victory 
in national legislative elections to Hamas, which has claimed 
responsibility for dozens of suicide bombings and desires the 
elimination of Israel. Bush's statement calling for new leaders was 
aimed at the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, but in the same 
speech he also said it was necessary to thwart Hamas -- formally the 
Islamic Resistance Movement -- and other militant groups.

The election outcome signals a dramatic failure in the administration's 
strategy for Middle East peace, according to analysts and some U.S. 
officials. Since the United States cannot deal with an organization 
labeled a terrorist organization by the State Department, Hamas's 
victory is likely to curtail U.S. aid, limit official U.S. contacts with 
the Palestinian government and stall efforts to create an independent 
Palestinian state.

More broadly, Hamas's victory is seen as a setback in the 
administration's campaign for greater democracy in the Middle East. 
Elections in Iran, Iraq, Egypt and now the Palestinian territories have 
resulted in the defeat of secular and moderate parties and the rise of 
Islamic parties hostile to U.S. interests.

The administration has long been criticized for being reluctant to get 
involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; even after Bush's 2002 
speech, the policy drifted except for occasional high-profile speeches 
and events. But after Arafat's death in late 2004 and the beginning of 
the new presidential term, Bush vowed things would be different, saying 
he would invest "political capital" in ensuring a Palestinian state 
before he leaves office three years from now.

The effort went wrong on three fronts, according to interviews inside 
and outside the administration:

· The administration put its hopes on the Palestinian president, Mahmoud 
Abbas, and poured hundreds of millions of dollars to fund public works 
projects. But it failed to back him when he asked for concrete help, 
especially in his dealings with the Israelis.

· The administration was highly attuned to the shifts of Israeli 
politics but tone-deaf to the upheaval in Palestinian society. It was so 
focused on facilitating Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip that it 
did not press Israel to end settlement expansion, release additional 
prisoners or take other measures that might have reduced Palestinian 
indignation.

· Despite deep Israeli misgivings, the administration late last year 
shifted policy and decided Hamas could participate in the elections even 
though it had not disarmed its militias, in contrast to rules set for 
elections in Afghanistan and Northern Ireland.

To be sure, a large share of the blame for Hamas's victory rests with 
Abbas -- widely perceived as weak and indecisive -- and his quarreling 
and often corrupt Fatah party. The Palestinian Authority proved 
incapable of governing Gaza after the Israeli withdrawal, adding to the 
perception of incompetence.

Analysts credit the Bush administration with focusing on building some 
governing institutions, such as a well-functioning Finance Ministry that 
handles the foreign aid that keeps the Palestinian Authority afloat. But 
many experts fault the administration for issuing high-sounding rhetoric 
without sustained involvement on the ground.

"There were eloquent speeches and praise for Abbas" but little else, 
said Robert Malley, director of the International Crisis Group's Middle 
East program, who was on President Bill Clinton's National Security 
Council staff. "There was an abstract faith in the idea that if you do 
the right thing, you will get a two-state solution."

The administration at the start of last year pledged it would take a 
low-key approach that would rely much more on nations in the region to 
carry the diplomatic burden. Officials were disdainful of the Clinton 
administration's deep involvement in the peace process, which they 
believed amounted to micromanaging. But over the course of the year, a 
top general was dispatched to help organize Palestinian security forces, 
former World Bank president James D. Wolfensohn was recruited to assist 
on the Gaza withdrawal and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 
November personally negotiated the opening of a border crossing.

The key to the administration's plan was Abbas, who was elected 
president after Arafat's death. Abbas had briefly been prime minister 
under Arafat in 2003, after international donors threatened to abandon 
Arafat if he did not allow the creation of a strong prime minister. 
Abbas quit after a few months, blaming both the United States and Israel 
for failing to back him up. Administration officials had said they would 
not repeat the mistake when he became president.

But Abbas faced a steep road. The administration was already perceived 
in the region as biased toward Israel, in part because Bush backed the 
Gaza withdrawal plan with pledges that Israel could keep large 
settlements and refuse the return of Palestinians in a final peace deal. 
Israel's departure from Gaza was designed to be a unilateral step, 
depriving Abbas of a negotiated peace victory he could claim; instead, 
Hamas asserted it had driven the Israelis out with its uncompromising 
approach.

Abbas cut a deal with Hamas, winning its agreement for a cease-fire in 
exchange for allowing it to participate in elections. But Abbas did not 
put conditions on its participation, such as giving up its weapons or 
even pledging not to attack Israelis -- a problem that did not capture 
the administration's attention until it was too late.

Abbas privately convinced U.S. officials that a Fatah victory would be a 
blow to Islamic extremism in the region, making the election showdown 
more enticing to an administration promoting democracy in the Middle 
East. He also pledged to quickly pass a law requiring the dismantling of 
militias as soon as the new legislature was elected. The original 
argument that he should take action against the militias sooner rather 
than later faded.

When Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned in September that he 
would try to block Hamas's participation unless it disbanded its militia 
and accepted Israel's right to exist, the administration forced the 
Israelis to back off. "Elections are fundamental to the continued 
evolution and development of the Palestinian process," Rice said.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/27/AR2006012701562.html?nav=hcmodule
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