[Mb-civic] Not with a bang, but a strategy - Mitchell B. Reiss - Boston Globe Op-Ed

William Swiggard swiggard at comcast.net
Sun Jan 22 03:09:27 PST 2006


  Not with a bang, but a strategy

By Mitchell B. Reiss  |  January 22, 2006  |  The Boston Globe

AMERICA'S DEBATE on Iraq is over. Iraq's elections last month and an 
emerging bipartisan consensus in the United States have ensured that 
America will leave only as soon as the Iraqi military, security, and 
police forces are capable of performing their respective missions. For 
Washington, what remains undecided are tactical issues -- the precise 
timing and terms of our departure and the residual American force presence.

While these issues will command much attention in the coming months, 
Washington needs to address the strategic consequences of its exit from 
Iraq. How the United States manages its departure will influence not 
only the future of Iraq and security of the Persian Gulf, but also 
America's global standing. Guiding a successful transition will be the 
primary diplomatic challenge for the Bush administration.

Unfortunately, Washington may be unable to control all aspects of its 
transition from Iraq. The pace and timing of our exit may be set by the 
new Iraqi government, which could find it irresistible to burnish its 
nationalist credentials by demanding that US forces leave Iraq ahead of 
the Pentagon's timetable. The insurgents are also likely to continue 
their murderous assault on US forces in order to claim credit for 
driving the United States from the field. Overseas opponents of the war 
will portray America's withdrawal as failed imperial hubris.

To counter any perception of weakness, the United States needs to devise 
a comprehensive strategy that not only maximizes the chances for success 
in Iraq, but also reassures the Persian Gulf states that Washington will 
continue to play a stabilizing regional role and works with the 
international community to ensure it will emerge from Iraq in a stronger 
strategic position.

A relatively stable, representative, and economically viable Iraq will 
clearly be the most effective rebuttal to any perceptions of American 
infirmity. Washington must continue to support the new Iraqi government, 
promote the inclusion of all factions, and complete the training of 
security and police forces.

The military task can be made easier if Iraqi forces can concentrate on 
internal security and not worry about external threats. The United 
States and the international community should guarantee Iraq's borders 
against its meddlesome neighbors. Reaffirming Iraq's territorial 
integrity through a UN Security Council resolution would tie the UN and 
great powers more firmly to Iraq's future and place its neighbors on notice.

The Persian Gulf states are especially anxious that the US withdrawal 
from Iraq not herald a wholesale exit from the region, especially given 
Iran's newly aggressive foreign policy. The United States must reassure 
them that they remain a vital national security interest.

This message can be conveyed by our continued military presence 
elsewhere in the region, which should remain robust. But it needs to be 
supplemented by creative diplomacy that promotes greater integration of 
counter-terrorism and border security efforts among these countries. We 
should also consider a more active role for NATO, which would serve the 
dual purpose of investing our European allies in this region and 
providing a multilateral context in which US forces could operate more 
effectively.

The Bush administration will need to convince an American people 
wearying of overseas commitments that there is little security in 
retreating behind Fortress America. Much important work remains. The war 
on terror and the transnational threats identified in the 
administration's 2002 National Security Strategy should receive greater 
time, attention, and resources than before.

It is essential to enlist partners to address these threats. Both the 
United States and Europe have a responsibility to ensure that the 
withdrawal from Iraq does not cause the same type of estrangement as did 
the run-up to the war. No one committed to the Atlantic Alliance can 
wish for a return to those days, or for an America that emerges from 
Iraq either weakened or isolationist.

As America leaves Iraq, we should recall that the decision to enter the 
war evolved from a debate over Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass 
destruction to a debate over the uses of American power in a post-9/11 
world. That debate remains unfinished. The Bush administration needs to 
reengage its critics and explain when America will defend its interests 
unilaterally, if necessary, and when it will act as a benign superpower 
willing to place its power in service to multilateral ends.

The White House's recent ''National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" 
spelled out succinctly the consequences of failure. But as we've learned 
all too well in Iraq, even battlefield victory is not enough to avoid 
reverses. As the United States exits Iraq, it needs to ensure that the 
manner of its departure advances America's broader strategic position in 
the region and globally.

Mitchell B. Reiss, director of policy planning at the US State 
Department from 2003-2005, is a vice provost at the College of William & 
Mary in Williamsburg, Va.

http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/01/22/not_with_a_bang_but_a_strategy/
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