[Mb-civic] Focusing on 'Success' In Iraq - Brent Scowcroft - Washington Post Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

Focusing on 'Success' In Iraq

By Brent Scowcroft
Monday, January 16, 2006; A17

The December election in Iraq could prove to be a seminal event. The 
parliament elected last month will choose a president and prime 
minister, providing Iraq its first elected government under a 
constitution approved by referendum. This government may well seek, or 
at least welcome, changes in the foreign military presence. In addition, 
President Bush has made clear that it will need to take increasing 
responsibility for rebuilding the country politically and economically, 
while Iraqi armed forces take increasing responsibility for defeating 
the insurgency.

The election was preceded and accompanied by a bitter and emotional 
debate in the United States about the future of the U.S. presence in 
Iraq. The coincidence of these events may provide a unique opportunity 
to review the role of foreign military forces and the international 
community as Iraq takes its next steps back into the community of 
nations. Such a review could usefully begin by turning over to the 
historians questions about how and why we got into Iraq. Whatever 
questions remain, we are there in force, and the central issue that 
confronts us is how we move forward most effectively.

The stakes -- for the United States and for the world -- are enormous. 
Iraq lies in the center of a region critical to the well-being of the 
global system. It is surrounded by states intensely concerned about the 
nature and future of that country and its government. A failed Iraq 
could be a catastrophe for the Middle East and a calamity for the world. 
At the moment such an outcome would be inevitable without the U.S. presence.

There are at least two elements essential to "success" in Iraq. The 
first is a central government that meets the needs of the people well 
enough to secure their sustained support, shows sufficient consideration 
for minority rights to win the loyalty of those minorities and 
demonstrates a credible determination to live in peace with its neighbors.

The second is an effective, highly disciplined military and security 
establishment that gives its allegiance not to various elements within 
Iraqi society but solely to the central government.

The fundamental question for the United States is what kind of policy is 
most likely to produce such an outcome and do so at a cost the American 
public is prepared to sustain. At the risk of oversimplification, it can 
be said that the "answers" proposed in the debate thus far fall into two 
broad categories. "Withdrawal" proposals range from immediate pullout to 
"setting a date certain." "Success" proposals range from "staying the 
course"(not clearly defined, but presumably meaning maintaining 
substantial forces in Iraq until the goals there have been achieved) to 
increasing the number of troops there.

The first category of proposals places primary emphasis on reducing the 
costs -- in blood and treasure -- that the United States is paying in 
Iraq. This would be achieved, however, by accepting (or ignoring) the 
very real risk that Iraq will not emerge as a viable state and that the 
region will descend into chaos. The second category of proposals 
underscores how critical it is to achieve "success." But the assumption 
is that the American people will continue to be willing to bear the 
burdens of Iraq indefinitely.

Both alternatives have unattractive or even unacceptable aspects. The 
real challenge is not to choose between them but to make the option that 
is most likely to advance the overall U.S. national interest -- the 
"success" option -- both more acceptable and more likely, by reducing 
its cost and risk. Clearly, progress has already been made, but we 
should do everything possible to enhance the prospects for success.

This could be accomplished through several steps designed to eventually 
make the foreign presence in Iraq more advisory in nature and more 
international in character, in ways resembling the course the United 
States has pursued in Afghanistan. The United Nations could be asked to 
assume a greater role in providing a more ecumenical political umbrella 
and expertise in building and coordinating institutions, programs and 
structures. After all, the United Nations played a significant role 
after the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime, until a bomb explosion 
prompted its exit from the country. The coalition forces are themselves 
in Iraq pursuant to a Security Council resolution. And U.N. personnel 
figured prominently in managing the recent parliamentary election. A 
U.N. presence of such magnitude, however, would require a dedicated 
security force, to prevent a repetition of the 2003 tragedy.

Such a force could be contributed by NATO or provided by other 
international military units. The new post-election circumstances, 
combined with an enhanced U.N. role, could provide a basis for asking 
countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco and Egypt to 
provide enough additional countrywide security and training capabilities 
to accelerate the development of a stable, progressive Iraqi state. 
(Some Arab states could provide financial support for infrastructure 
reconstruction and rehabilitation.) Initially, these forces might be 
engaged in missions such as the training of Iraqi troops, infrastructure 
protection and holding areas cleared of insurgents. The presence of such 
forces might also encourage members of the current coalition to continue 
their participation.

As the security situation improved and Iraqi military capability 
increased, these international forces could assume more of the 
traditional peacekeeping missions they have so effectively carried out 
in the past. This could allow the mission of the United States to be 
restructured and U.S. troop levels to be reduced.

To be sure, a searching, deliberative debate might disclose still other 
possible or more attractive courses of action. But above all, it is time 
to focus on our long-term goals in Iraq and on how best to go about 
achieving them at a sustainable cost.

The writer was national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and 
George H.W. Bush. He is now president of the Forum for International Policy.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/15/AR2006011500417.html?nav=hcmodule
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