[Mb-civic] A Shift on Iraq - David Ignatius - Washington Post

[William Swiggard]

A Shift on Iraq
The Generals Plan a Slow Exit

By David Ignatius
Monday, September 26, 2005; Page A23

DOHA, Qatar -- Posted on a bulletin board at Centcom headquarters here 
is a 1918 admonition from T.E. Lawrence explaining what he learned in 
training Arab soldiers: "It is better to let them do it themselves 
imperfectly than to do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their 
way, and our time is short."

That quote sums up an important shift in U.S. military strategy on Iraq 
that has been emerging over the past year. The commanders who are 
running the war don't talk about transforming Iraq into an 
American-style democracy or of imposing U.S. values. They understand 
that Iraqis dislike American occupation, and for that reason they want 
fewer American troops in Iraq, not more. Most of all, they don't want 
the current struggle against Iraqi insurgents, who are nasty but 
militarily insignificant, to undermine U.S. efforts against the larger 
threat posed by al Qaeda terrorists, who would kill hundreds of 
thousands of Americans if they could.

I had a rare opportunity to hear a detailed explanation of U.S. military 
strategy this weekend when the Centcom chief, Gen. John Abizaid, 
gathered his top generals here for what he called a "commanders' 
huddle." They described a military approach that's different, at least 
in tone, from what the public perceives. For the commanders, Iraq isn't 
an endless tunnel. They are planning to reduce U.S. troop levels over 
the next year to a force that will focus on training and advising the 
Iraqi military. They don't want permanent U.S. bases in Iraq. Indeed, 
they believe such a high-visibility American presence will only make it 
harder to stabilize the country.

The commanders' thinking is conveyed by a set of "Principles for a Long 
War" for combating the main enemy, al Qaeda and affiliated movements. 
Among the precepts they discussed here: "use the indirect approach" by 
working with Iraqi and other partner forces; "avoid the dependency 
syndrome" by making the Iraqis take responsibility for their own 
security and governance; and "remove the perception of occupation" by 
reducing the size and visibility of American forces. The goal over the 
next decade is a smaller, leaner, more flexible U.S. force in the Middle 
East -- one that can help regional allies rather than trying to fight an 
open-ended American war that would be a recruiting banner for al Qaeda.

"The longer we carry the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight, the 
longer we will carry the brunt," says Gen. George W. Casey Jr., who 
commands U.S. troops in Iraq. "The sooner we can shift [to Iraqi 
security forces] the better." Casey explains: "A smaller U.S. footprint, 
that is allowed to decline gradually as Iraqi forces get stronger, 
actually helps us."

Abizaid and Casey know there is tough fighting ahead in Iraq. Because 
the insurgency isn't strong enough to attack U.S. forces head-on, it has 
instead used suicide attacks and roadside bombs with deadly effect -- 
especially against Iraqis. There were 412 suicide bombings in Iraq from 
January through August, killing about 8,000 Iraqis, according to U.S. 
statistics. The number of suicide attacks in August was eight times 
higher than a year before.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/25/AR2005092501298.html
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