[Mb-civic] FW: M. Rubin in Forward: "Washington Must Plan Today For Democratic Iran of Tomorrow"

[villasudjuan]

------ Forwarded Message
From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2005 09:54:19 -0400
Subject: M. Rubin in Forward: "Washington Must Plan Today For Democratic
Iran of Tomorrow"


 
Washington Must Plan Today For Democratic Iran of Tomorrow
by Michael Rubin
Forward
July 8, 2005
http://www.meforum.org/article/733

Two weeks ago, obscure hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad swept to victory in
Iran's run-off presidential election. In his first news conference as
president-elect, he vowed to continue Iran's nuclear program.

"Today," Ahmadinejad proclaimed, "we can say that nuclear technology is our
right."

A nuclear Islamic Republic would undermine any prospect for Iranian reform,
Middle East peace or a cessation of the regime's sponsorship of terrorism.
Yet even as Ahmadinejad's victory has undercut hope that European Union
diplomacy can resolve disputes over enrichment in the Islamic Republic's
nuclear program, the Bush administration still lacks a consistent policy on
Iran.

Washington's chief concern is not that Iran would use nuclear weapons ‹
although Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president who lost the run-off
election to Ahmadinejad but who remains the second most powerful man in
Tehran, threatened to do just that on December 14, 2001. Rather, the
administration's worry is that with a nuclear deterrent, Iranian hardliners
might feel themselves immune from the consequences of their actions.

Washington's skepticism about Tehran's intentions is deep-rooted. In
December 2002, American intelligence confirmed the existence of clandestine
nuclear enrichment facilities in Iran. The Iranian government initially said
that it had no outside assistance with its centrifuge program, but after
tests by the International Atomic Energy Association, or IAEA, found traces
of weapons-grade uranium on Iranian centrifuges, Iranian officials changed
their story and said that the contamination came from imported equipment not
previously declared.

Likewise, the Iranian government revealed to the IAEA on May 26 that
contrary to Tehran's previous insistence that it had ceased plutonium work
in 1993, such work had continued for another five years. And on June 15,
Rafsanjani told the BBC, "It's possible that at times, Iran has not reported
its activities."

Suspicions over the Iranian government's intentions have also grown because
of its refusal to ratify the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's Additional
Protocol, drafted in response to the IAEA's failure to detect Saddam
Hussein's pre-1991 nuclear weapons and approved in May 1997. More than 60
countries have ratified the new agreement, which subjects signatories to
augmented reporting requirements and also grants the IAEA increased powers
of inspection. In exchange, countries have enhanced access to technology.

Tehran, though, found a loophole: By signing but not ratifying the
additional protocol, it gained the agreement's benefits, but remained
outside the new inspection regime.

Statements by Iranian diplomats that the Islamic Republic's program is
peaceful have been undercut by officials close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. On May 29, hardline cleric Gholam Reza Hasani declared, "An
atom bomb... must be produced as well. That is because the Koran has told
Muslims to 'get strong and amass all the forces at your disposal to be
strong.'" While Hasani is unpopular with most Iranians, he remains a
confidant of the supreme leader and a window into his thinking.

The Iranian public, for its part, has had mixed reactions to the
government's nuclear program. While pursuit of nuclear power is popular
domestically, support among Iranians erodes sharply when they are asked not
about Iran's right to nuclear technology, but about nuclear weapons. Shortly
before the Iranian election, the Tarrance Group conducted a professional
telephone survey of more than 750 Iranians. A plurality of respondents said
that an Iranian nuclear weapons arsenal would add to their anxiety and
discomfort.

Last month President Bush reiterated that "the Iranian people deserve a
genuinely democratic system in which elections are honest and in which their
leaders answer to them instead of the other way around." His administration,
however, shows little inclination to work toward such goals.

State Department Policy Planning Director Stephen Krasner, for example,
tapped an ExxonMobil Middle East advisor to advise him on Iran. She has
since circulated papers friendly to the oil giant's policy of rapprochement
and renewed trade with the Islamic Republic.

While the Bush administration has committed itself to support E.U. diplomacy
with Iran, few officials believe the effort will succeed. Privately, many
European diplomats say they believe it inevitable that Iran will get nuclear
weapons ‹ a tacit admission that their diplomacy is insincere. Some French
and German officials have argued that Washington poses a greater threat than
Tehran. By not demanding a timeline for diplomacy, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice has allowed Europe to filibuster as Tehran runs down the
clock.

Meanwhile, as the Iranian nuclear threat grows daily, it becomes ever more
clear that certain policies will simply not work ‹ expecting United Nations
sanctions against Iran when oil hovers at $60 per barrel is pure fantasy.

As for Europe's prescription of economic engagement, it will neither help
reform nor take the edge off the Islamic Republic's excesses because of the
structure of the Iranian economy. Perhaps a third of Iran's gross domestic
product ‹ and the bulk of its industry ‹ are in the hands of bonyads, or
"revolutionary foundations," whose heads are appointed by Khamenei.
Enhancing business with Iran would inject capital directly into hardline
coffers, bolstering their relative power. The beauty of Bush's "Axis of
Evil" speech was that without violence, it shook investor confidence in the
Islamic Republic, and hit the pocketbooks of the regime's elite.

Track II non-governmental efforts will also flounder because of the tendency
of both American academics and European diplomats to serve as echo chambers
for Iranian rhetoric and because Iranian authorities refuse visas to voices
less dismissive of American security concerns. Likewise, enhancing academic
and cultural exchange will fall short: At the height of President Mohammad
Khatami's "dialogue of civilizations," the State Department issued 22,000
visas to Iranians; the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued only 800 visas to
American passport holders.

No American official has called for invasion nor, despite accusations to the
contrary, has there been any proposal to employ the Mujahidin al-Khalq ‹ an
organization guilty of terrorism against Iranians, Iraqis and Americans ‹ in
pursuit of regime change. The White House nevertheless has a number of
policies that could empower Iranians to the point where they win the same
rights for themselves that Georgians, Ukrainians, Lebanese and even
Bhutanese have in the past year.

A democratic Iran might not abandon its nuclear program, but neither would
it sponsor anti-American terrorism, undercut the Middle East peace process
or deny Israel's right to exist. Democratization, therefore, can take the
edge off the Iranian threat.

A good start would be Iran's labor unions, which Tehran seeks to license and
control. Iranian workers complain of rampant regime corruption. Hundreds of
textile plants have gone bankrupt in recent years, according to the Islamic
Republic's own press. In one instance, a bonyad sold a plant; the new owner
then laid off the workers and sold the land for his personal profit.
Protests at one Isfahan textile mill led to the deployment of security
forces. Iranian pilgrims in Iraq spoke of deteriorating conditions and
increasing tensions in Iran's oil fields. Pollution has cut the lucrative
Iranian caviar harvest.

There is no reason why ‹ as Poland prepares to mark the 25th anniversary of
the Solidarity Movement ‹ Europeans and Americans should support labor at
home, in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, but deny aid to Iranian
workers.

Washington should also take steps to bolster Iranian civil society. The
January 30 elections in Iraq established voter participation as a measure of
Middle Eastern government legitimacy, yet most Western journalists have
accepted for last month's election voter participation figures issued by
Iran's Interior Ministry.

Iranians visiting Iraq, however, contradict their government's statistics.
While the Iranian government bragged about a 50% turnout in 2004
parliamentary elections, pilgrims suggested that in most provinces, the
figure was less than 15%. The State Department should consider funding
organizations capable of conducting independent surveys to reduce reliance
on Tehran's often imaginary numbers.

America and Europe can also do much more to encourage that most cherished of
Western values, freedom of speech. Iran hosts the world's third-largest
blogging community. While authorities began cracking down on young web
journalists in August 2004, Iranian youth are bold. They should have access
to digital cameras and other equipment. Because the regime shuts down the
cell phone network during demonstrations, student leaders should have
satellite phones. Iranian satellite networks based in Los Angeles and
elsewhere can also play an important role because of their immunity from
regime intimidation.

As they near the 100th anniversary of their Constitutional Revolution,
Iranians are increasingly bold in their demands for democracy. Washington
should spare no effort to support them, cynical and counterproductive
European resistance to democratization notwithstanding.

Should non-violent options fail, however, Bush may decide that pinpoint
military strikes are the only mechanism by which to undercut the Islamic
Republic's ambitions. And yet, his administration has yet to develop
alternative strategies to fulfill his stated policy goals. As Iranian
authorities pursue their race for nuclear weapons, American officials remain
fumbling at the starting line, unsure of which direction to run.

In 2002, Rice delayed post-Saddam Iraq planning for fear of undercutting
U.N. diplomacy. The Bush administration should not make the same mistake
twice. E.U. efforts are nice, but the White House should not place all its
eggs in a French basket.
 
> Michael Rubin, a former staff adviser for Iran and Iraq in the Office of the
> Secretary of Defense, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise
> Institute and editor of the Middle East Quarterly.

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