[Mb-civic] EDITORIAL Insurance for Electronic Votes NYTimes

[Michael Butler]

July 23, 2004

Insurance for Electronic Votes

his November, millions of voters will use electronic voting machines of
questionable reliability. The election is by now too near for the sort of
major overhaul that electronic voting requires. But there is still time for
states and localities to protect the integrity of the voting and build
public confidence in the results. The public should insist that election
officials put these protections in place right away.

There has been extensive documentation of the problems with electronic
voting. Several studies have found that it is vulnerable to vote theft and
to inadvertent errors that can alter the outcome of an election. These
inherent flaws are made worse by the reckless, and possibly illegal, actions
of voting machine companies. This spring, California banned 14,000 Diebold
voting machines because of allegations of "fraudulent actions" by the
manufacturer.

In a well-run election system, electronic voting machines costing millions
of dollars would not have been purchased before there were adequate
standards for ensuring that they work properly. But given that nearly
one-third of voters may be voting electronically this fall, it is fortunate
that a number of private groups - including the Brennan Center for Justice
at the New York University Law School and the Caltech/M.I.T. Voting
Technology Project - have stepped forward with ideas for how election
officials can minimize the risks. Kevin Shelley, the California secretary of
state and a pioneer in the field, has also issued useful directives, many of
which are on his official Web site.

 Here are some things voters should demand:

Physical security for electronic systems Electronic voting machines must be
kept secure at all times. It seems like an obvious point, but it's been
ignored too often. In Georgia's March primary, voting machines were reported
to have been delivered early to a polling place in a university student
center, and left unattended. Some places start up machines the night before
the election, a clear security risk.

 The locks and antitampering devices on machines must be more secure. A
study earlier this year in Maryland found, unbelievably, that all 16,000
electronic voting machines in the state had identical locks, which could be
opened with a single key. The entire "chain of custody" of the voting, from
the casting of ballots to the final tabulation, must be kept secure.
Computers used in elections must not be used for anything else. All software
used on them should be certified, and logs should be kept of everyone who
has access to them.

Rigorous testing of electronic machines In many jurisdictions, testing is
woefully inadequate. The machines should be exhaustively tested in advance,
with real people casting votes, not simply machines "self-testing" their
accuracy. The tests should use all of the ballot configurations that will be
used in the election, and in large enough sample sizes to draw meaningful
conclusions.

Randomly selected machines should be continually tested throughout Election
Day. This "parallel monitoring," as it is known, can test parts of the
system that come into play only during actual voting. It can ensure that no
malicious software was installed that was designed to look honest before and
after voting, but to steal votes during the election itself.

Properly trained poll workers, and rapid-response teams on Election Day Many
of the problems that have occurred so far with electronic voting were due to
election workers' errors. Poll workers must be extensively trained in the
use of electronic voting machines, and given clearly written materials. On
Election Day, there should be enough technology experts available to handle
problems as they occur, monitoring teams doing spot checks for malfunctions
and tampering, and rapid-response teams available for quick on-site visits.

Public records at the precinct level The more records that are created of
vote totals, and the earlier in the process such records are created, the
harder it is to steal votes. When the polls close, the results should be
printed out and posted at each precinct and should remain there for at least
one day to protect against alterations in the totals during transmission to
the central office. Election results for precincts should also be
immediately posted online.

 The option to vote non-electronically Many voters do not trust electronic
voting, and many are not confident of their computer skills. Any voter
should be able to use a paper ballot. A review of Florida's primary this
March found that elderly voters were more likely than others to cast ballots
that did not select a candidate. Forcing people to vote electronically could
lead to a rerun of the infamous "butterfly ballot" of 2000, with overly
complicated voting technology that disenfranchises voters.

 Independent security experts The short history of electronic voting has
shown that manufacturers cannot be trusted when it comes to the reliability
of their products. Jurisdictions that use electronic voting should employ
outside experts to test their systems. These tests should be done well in
advance and made public. Voters should be told what is being done to address
any problems.

 Transparency in electronic voting As we saw again this month in Florida,
which was forced to scrap a flawed list of felons to be purged from voter
rolls that it had originally kept from the public, secrecy in election
administration is often a cover for incompetence, or even partisan
manipulation. Voters should be able to monitor every aspect of electronic
voting, from the purchase of machines to the final tabulation of votes, and
offered enough training that they can understand what they are seeing.

In the long run, electronic voting should not be allowed without
unimpeachable and mandatory security standards, and machines that allow
voters to see paper records and ensure that their votes are properly
recorded. Unfortunately, a large part of the electorate will be using
electronic machines this fall that lack these safeguards. Election officials
have an obligation to act now to make the system as reliable as possible.

Making Votes Count: Editorials in this series remain online at
www.nytimes.com/makingvotescount.

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